MIL-HDBK-526 describes a way of learning and dealing with the aircraft nuclear compatibility certification tasks required by the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center (AFNWC), NNSA, and SNL. This handbook provides guidance for the requirements defined in MIL-STD-1822 (Section 4), and provides a description in paragraph 4.21 how ground launched missile compatibility certification is accomplished for comparison purposes.

To structure the information in this Handbook, the tasks are defined in AFI 63-125 and MIL-STD-1822. This Handbook will help the reader understand what the job/task is and what needs to be done to complete the aircraft compatibility certification task. The Air Force Nuclear Certification Process is described in detail in AFI 63-125. The Major elements of nuclear certification are: design certification and operational certification. Components of design certification are: compatibility certification, nuclear safety design certification, safety rules development, and technical order certification. Although all components of design certification are closely related and arguably difficult to totally separate, this document will focus on mechanical and electrical nuclear weapon compatibility certification on the aircraft platform. The Nuclear Weapon System Compatibility is the capability of two or more nuclear weapon system components of equipment or material to exist or function in the same system or environment without mutual interference. Nuclear weapon system compatibility evaluations are a component of Operational Suitability as established in AFI 63-101/20-101. Nuclear weapon system operational suitability is a measure of the degree to which a nuclear weapon system or end-item can be placed satisfactorily into field use with consideration given to availability, compatibility, transportation, interoperability, and reliability. A successful nuclear weapon system compatibility evaluation (and subsequent NCCS) is a component of the Air Force's Nuclear Weapon System Certification and Systems Engineering processes. Nuclear safety design certification requirements are closely related to compatibility requirements. They are described in detail in AFMAN 91-118, Safety Design and Evaluation Criteria for Nuclear Weapon Systems, and AFMAN 91-119, Safety Design and Evaluation Criteria for Nuclear Weapon Systems Software, and are not repeated here. According to DODD 3150.02, section 4.2.8, "Nuclear weapon system safety, security, survivability, and use control are interrelated. Decisions concerning one should not be made without consideration of the effect of those decisions on the others." Guidance for evaluation and reporting for nuclear compatibility certification are also delineated.

This Handbook also covers the needs of survivable nuclear weapons need survivable support equipment in paragraph 4.6. To address the interrelation of survivability with safety and security, AFNWC has a nuclear technology analysis branch, which provides scientific oversight of the RN part of the CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear) survivability mission. This branch monitors development and modification of nuclear weapons, their components, or subassemblies for compliance with Military Characteristics and Stockpile-To-Target Sequence survivability requirements.